Summary Critique of the Draft Law on Aquatic Fishing and Aquaculture in Lebanon

The current draft law presents an administrative and technical framework aimed at regulating the sector, but it lacks sufficient social and economic guarantees to protect traditional fishermen and workers. The report concludes that the law, in its current form, poses fundamental risks to social justice, national sovereignty, and resource sustainability.

Key Risks and Fundamental Criticisms of the Law

1 Entrenching Monopoly and Marginalizing Small-Scale Fishers

Lack of Differentiation: The law unifies the definition of small-scale artisanal fishing and industrial/capitalist fishing (Article 1), imposing the same obligations on both. Impossible Burdens: Small-scale fishermen (owners of 'Felouka' boats) are mandated to comply with technically and bureaucratically impossible conditions (such as mechanical refrigeration and complex fishing logs), threatening to exclude them from the market.

2 Privatization of the Sea and Weakening Sovereignty

Ocean Grabbing: Chapter Seven on Aquaculture threatens to privatize the public shoreline and maritime domain, sidelining small projects in favor of large corporations. Opening Doors to Foreign Fleets: Article 50 opens the door for foreign fleets to fish in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) without sufficient guarantees for Lebanon's rights and workers.

3 Social Justice and Workers' Rights

Unfair Fees: The fee structure (Article 105) heavily burdens the small-scale fisher compared to industrial vessels. Lack of Protection: Articles on aquaculture (Articles 88 and 96) do not adequately address decent working conditions and social protection for workers.

Key Strategic Recommendations

Priority for Artisanal Fishing

Add an independent definition for 'Small-Scale Artisanal Fishing' and grant it absolute priority in accessing resources and protecting it from industrial competition.

Participatory Management

Establish joint management committees (Co-management Committees) and a National Council for Fishery Resources, including elected representatives of artisanal fishers to ensure their participation in decision-making and quota setting.

Protected Zone for Small-Scale Fishers

Establish an 'Artisanal Fishing Zone' extending up to six nautical miles, where industrial fishing and bottom trawling are strictly prohibited to ensure coastal fishery sustainability.

Support and Social Protection

Redraft the fee structure to exempt small boats and dedicate a percentage of fee revenues to establish a fund supporting the modernization of the artisanal fleet and providing social insurance for fishers.

Table of Notes on the Draft Law and Proposed Amendments

1. General Framework of the Crisis of Marine Fishing in Lebanon

The marine fishing sector in Lebanon, one of the oldest traditional economic sectors in the eastern Mediterranean, faces existential challenges that threaten its continuity and its social and cultural pattern. For centuries, the 220-kilometer-long Lebanese coast has been a lifeline for coastal communities that depend wholly or partially on marine resources.

1.1 Historical and Legislative Context: From the 1929 Law to the 2025 Draft

However, this sector has remained governed by an outdated legislative framework dating back to the French Mandate era, specifically Decision No. 2775 issued in 1929, which no longer addresses the massive technological, economic, and environmental transformations witnessed in the 21st century.

The 'Draft Law on Aquatic Fishing and Aquaculture', prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture and circulated and discussed in joint parliamentary committees, comes as an attempt to update this legal framework. The project ostensibly aims to regulate the sector, protect fishery resources, and encourage investment in aquaculture. However, when subjecting the texts of this project to the microscope of critical analysis, and deconstructing the structure of its articles, a deep gap appears between the declared objectives and the expected results on the ground, especially regarding its impact on small-scale fishers (SSF - Small-Scale Fishers).

A careful reading of the project reveals an adoption of a 'modernization' model based on promoting large capital investments, opening the maritime domain to commercial companies, and legalizing the entry of foreign fleets, while the traditional artisanal fisherman is marginalized and besieged with an arsenal of technical conditions, financial fees, and criminal penalties, without providing a social safety net or protection for his local market. This orientation reflects a structural bias towards neoliberal economic systems that see the sea as a 'space for investment and profit' and not as a 'public property and a source of food security and sovereignty'.

1.2 Socio-Economic Reality of the Artisanal Fishing Sector Amid Financial Collapse

The reading of the draft law cannot be isolated from the catastrophic economic context that Lebanon has been experiencing since 2019. The financial collapse and the devaluation of the national currency by more than 98% have led to unprecedented impoverishment of fishermen, who have become unable to maintain their boats or buy fishing equipment priced in US dollars, while their products are sold in the local market at low prices that do not cover operating costs.

The Lebanese fleet consists overwhelmingly (more than 96%) of small boats less than 12 meters in length, most of which are traditional 'Felouka' boats less than 6 meters long and operating with simple engines. These fishermen are not merely 'workers' in an economic sector, but rather guardians of maritime heritage and an integral part of the social fabric of coastal cities (Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, Tripoli, Batroun). They suffer from an almost complete absence of social protection, as they are not covered by the National Social Security Fund, and live 'day to day'. In this context, the draft law comes to impose additional burdens on them (such as refrigeration conditions, fishing logs, and license renewals with new fees) without offering them any tangible return in terms of support or protection. Rather, the project threatens to increase their competition by legislating the industrial aquaculture sector and allowing foreign vessels to operate in the Exclusive Economic Zone, placing them before an impossible equation: either turning into wage laborers for large companies, or leaving the sea permanently.

1.3 Adopted Methodology: Human Rights Approach and FAO Guidelines

This report relies in its critical analysis on a fundamental reference represented in the 'Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication' (SSF Guidelines) issued by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 2014. These guidelines, which Lebanon ratified as a member of the organization, call for adopting a 'Human Rights-Based Approach' in fisheries management, focusing on:

• Tenure Rights: Ensuring fishermen's rights to access resources and traditional fishing grounds and protecting them from encroachment or privatization.
• Co-management: Effectively involving fishermen in decision-making, not just formally consulting them.
• Social Development: Linking fisheries management to social protection, education, and health.
• Gender Equality: Recognizing the role of women in the value chain.

These criteria will be used as a yardstick to measure the fairness and sustainability of the texts of the proposed draft law, and compare them with best practices and international experiences, especially in countries of the Global South that faced similar challenges from industrial fleets and large investments.

2. Chapter One: The Definition and Classification Problem – 'One Size' Crushes the Small

The original sin of the draft law lies in its definitional structure, which ignores the huge disparities between categories of fishermen, leading to the application of uniform standards that are theoretically fair but very unfair in application.

2.1 Article 1 Analysis: Lack of Distinction between Subsistence Fishing and Capitalist Investment

Article 1 of the draft law stipulates general and vague definitions for 'professional fisherman' and 'professional fishing'. Professional fishing is defined as 'any aquatic fishing activity practiced for commercial purposes and as a main source of income'. This definition combines in one legal basket:

• The traditional fisherman who owns a small boat (5 meters) and works alone or with a family member to secure his daily sustenance, selling limited quantities at the local port.
• The large investor who owns a fleet of technologically equipped boats, or a company managing huge fish farms and exporting its production abroad.

Equating these two models under the name 'professional' leads to applying the same legal and financial obligations to them, which contradicts FAO recommendations calling for a distinction between 'Small-Scale' and 'Industrial' fishing to grant the former preferential protection. In the proposed Lebanese law, the definition of 'artisanal fishing' is absent as an independent legal category requiring special treatment, making the small fisherman vulnerable to requirements designed primarily to regulate companies and large operations.

2.2 Technical and Bureaucratic Burdens: Impossibility of Compliance for Small Boats

The results of this definitional flaw appear clearly in the regulatory articles that impose impossible technical conditions on small fishermen:

<strong>المادة 12 (تبريد الأحياء المائية):</strong> تفرض هذه المادة على ‘مراكب الصيد المرخصة أن تكون مجهزة بوسائل تبريد ملائمة لتخزين الأحياء المائية المصطادة’. بالنظر إلى واقع الأسطول اللبناني، حيث تشكل القوارب المكشوفة (Undecked vessels) نسبة كبيرة، وحيث لا تتجاوز مساحة ‘الفلوكة’ بضعة أمتار مربعة، فإن إلزام هذه القوارب بتركيب أنظمة تبريد (مكلفة وتتطلب مولدات طاقة) هو شرط مستحيل التنفيذ تقنياً ومالياً. هذا الشرط قد يؤدي إلى اعتبار آلاف القوارب ‘مخالفة للقانون’ وحرمانها من الترخيص، مما يخرج صغار الصيادين من السوق لصالح المراكب الأكبر القادرة على الامتثال.” data-en=”<strong>Article 12 (Refrigeration of Aquatic Organisms):</strong> This article requires ‘licensed fishing vessels to be equipped with appropriate refrigeration means for storing caught aquatic organisms’. Given the reality of the Lebanese fleet, where undecked vessels constitute a large proportion, and where the area of the ‘Felouka’ does not exceed a few square meters, requiring these boats to install cooling systems (expensive and requiring power generators) is a technically and financially impossible condition. This condition may lead to thousands of boats being considered ‘illegal’ and denied licenses, pushing small fishermen out of the market in favor of larger vessels capable of compliance.”> <strong>المادة 12 (تبريد الأحياء المائية):</strong> تفرض هذه المادة على “مراكب الصيد المرخصة أن تكون مجهزة بوسائل تبريد ملائمة لتخزين الأحياء المائية المصطادة”. بالنظر إلى واقع الأسطول اللبناني، حيث تشكل القوارب المكشوفة (Undecked vessels) نسبة كبيرة، وحيث لا تتجاوز مساحة “الفلوكة” بضعة أمتار مربعة، فإن إلزام هذه القوارب بتركيب أنظمة تبريد (مكلفة وتتطلب مولدات طاقة) هو شرط مستحيل التنفيذ تقنياً ومالياً. هذا الشرط قد يؤدي إلى اعتبار آلاف القوارب “مخالفة للقانون” وحرمانها من الترخيص، مما يخرج صغار الصيادين من السوق لصالح المراكب الأكبر القادرة على الامتثال. </p> <p data-ar=

2.3 Ignoring Lebanese Specificity: The 'Felouka' Fleet Facing Industrial Standards

Statistics indicate that the average length of a fishing boat in Lebanon is 7 meters, and that 98% of the fleet is less than 12 meters long. This means that fishing in Lebanon is quintessentially 'artisanal'. However, the draft law imports concepts and standards suitable for ocean fisheries or industrial countries (such as detailed fishing logs, complex refrigeration conditions, and expensive navigation safety equipment in Article 11).

This disconnect from local reality leads to:

• Raising the cost of entry into the sector: preventing youth from inheriting the profession, leading to the aging of the fishing sector (average fisherman age 51 years).
• Reinforcing class inequality: where only the financially capable can meet licensing conditions, while poor fishermen turn into 'irregular workers' subject to prosecution and penalties.

3. Chapter Two: Aquaculture as an Entry Point for 'Sea Grabbing'

The draft law devotes Chapter Seven entirely to regulating 'aquaculture facilities'. Although fish farming is presented as a solution to the food security crisis, the proposed legal framework carries serious risks related to the privatization of the public maritime domain.

3.1 Critical Reading of Chapter Seven: Legislating Sea Privatization

Articles 81 to 87 grant the Ministry of Agriculture broad powers to license the establishment of fish farms in 'Lebanese waters and on private and public properties'. Most dangerous in this context is Article 86, which grants the licensee 'individual or institutional ownership of the produced fish stocks' and the right to invest in the facility.

In a country already suffering from 'occupation' of the coast through illegal tourist resorts preventing citizens from accessing the sea, this law comes to transfer the logic of privatization from land to water. Granting long-term (renewable) licenses to private companies to occupy areas of the sea (for floating cages) effectively means privatizing part of the public maritime domain. Given the history of corruption and nepotism in license distribution in Lebanon, there are real fears that the most prime maritime locations (least exposed to currents, close to services) will go to major companies and political influentials, depriving fishermen and the general public of using these spaces.

3.2 Existential Threat to Traditional Fishing Grounds and Tenure Rights

The FAO SSF Guidelines consider protecting fishermen's 'tenure rights' in their fishing grounds and landing areas as the cornerstone of fisheries sustainability. However, the draft law lacks any explicit text prohibiting the establishment of fish farms in traditional artisanal fishing grounds, or mandating their prior and binding consultation before granting licenses.

Establishing floating cages at sea usually leads to:

• Banning fishing in the vicinity of farms: for security and protective reasons, reducing available spaces for fishermen, who already suffer from the narrow Lebanese continental shelf.
• Spatial conflicts: Competition for the same near-shore coastal areas relied upon by 'fixed net' fishermen and fish farms.

This scenario is known globally as 'Sea Grabbing', where rights to use the sea are stripped from traditional local communities and handed over to capitalist corporations under the guise of 'development' and 'investment'.

3.3 Environmental and Economic Impacts of Large Fish Farms on the Fragile Ecosystem

Despite the law requiring an environmental impact assessment (Article 84), Lebanese experiences with weak environmental oversight (as in waste disposal and sewage at sea) are concerning. Intensive aquaculture requires large quantities of feed and antibiotics, whose residues leak into the surrounding marine environment. This pollution leads to:

• Change in water quality in coastal areas.
• Spread of diseases that may transmit from farmed fish to wild fish, hitting the natural stock artisanal fishermen depend on.
• Risk of escape of farmed fish (which may be invasive or genetically improved species) and their competition with local species, threatening the unique biodiversity of the Mediterranean.

Economically, industrial aquaculture often relies on importing feed and equipment, meaning hard currency outflow, while production is marketed to compete with local fishermen at potentially lower prices (due to Economies of Scale), leading to market flooding and destroying the viability of traditional fishing.

4. Chapter Three: Violated Sovereignty – Foreign Vessels and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

The law devotes a special section (Chapter Six) to regulating the work of 'foreign fishing vessels', creating a dangerous legislative precedent in the context of the Lebanese state reality.

4.1 Article 50 Analysis: Opening the Door to Industrial Fleets and Depletion Risks

Article 50 explicitly allows foreign fishing vessels to fish for aquatic organisms in the waters of the Lebanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under a license from the Minister of Agriculture.

• Strategic Danger: Experiences in other developing countries, especially in West Africa (Senegal, Mauritania), show that allowing foreign industrial fleets (European, Chinese, Russian) to operate in national waters led to an environmental and economic disaster. These giant ships use Bottom Trawling and industrial equipment that sweep everything, depleting fish stocks in record time.
• Economic Illusion: Governments often promote these agreements as a source of income (license fees). But studies prove that losses resulting from destroying fish stocks, hitting the local artisanal sector, and losing added value far outweigh meager fee revenues.
• Nature of Fish: Fish in the Exclusive Economic Zone are not 'isolated', but are Straddling Stocks or migratory. Depleting them in the deep affects directly the quantities reaching coastal areas where the Lebanese fisherman operates.

4.2 'Flags of Convenience' and Legal Loopholes in Oversight

Article 51 considers that the foreign vessel master must prove non-involvement in illegal fishing. However, the law ignores the dilemma of 'Flags of Convenience'. Where large companies register their ships in countries with weak oversight to evade laws and taxes. The law allows foreign vessels to land their cargo in Lebanese ports (Article 53). This practically means Lebanon could turn into a 'haven port' for vessels practicing IUU fishing in the Mediterranean, or this article could be used to legitimize foreign fleet fishing in Lebanese waters and unloading it directly to hit the local market, known as 'dumping'.

4.3 Lebanese State's Inability to Enforce Law in Deep Waters: Reality of Naval Capabilities

The most fundamental point in critiquing this chapter is 'enforcement capability'. The Lebanese Navy and Ministry of Agriculture suffer from acute shortages in logistical resources. The Ministry does not have enough patrol boats, fuel for patrols, nor effective and activated VMS satellite monitoring systems to monitor every ship in the EEZ. Given this deficit, granting licenses to foreign ships to operate offshore is akin to giving a 'blank check' to plunder fishery resources without any effective oversight. Relying on 'logs' submitted by the shipmaster (as in Article 52) is legislative naivety in the industrial fishing world known for data manipulation.

5. Chapter Four: Political Economy of the Local Market – Between Monopoly and Dumping

The law blatantly lacks any vision to regulate the market and protect the fisherman from commercial exploitation, contenting itself with regulating the fishing process itself.

5.1 Distorted Value Chains: Dominance of the Karantina Market 'Cartel' and Lack of Protection

The Lebanese fisherman suffers from a monopolistic market structure, where a limited number of merchants and middlemen (especially in the Karantina central fish market) control prices. These merchants impose low prices on fishermen, then sell fish to consumers and restaurants at double the price, exploiting the lack of effective marketing cooperatives and the fisherman's weak storage or negotiation capacity. The draft law does not address in any of its articles regulating the 'wholesale market' or breaking these monopolies, nor does it include mechanisms for 'price support' or encouraging 'direct sale' from fisherman to consumer, considered a key pillar for improving fishermen's income according to FAO guidelines.

5.2 Impact of Fish Imports and Foreign Fleet Fishing on Local Prices

Lebanon imports about 90% of its fish needs (about 35,000 tons annually before the crisis). This massive reliance on imports, often from countries subsidizing their fleets (like Turkey and Egypt), puts local fish in unfair competition. Article 53 exacerbates this by allowing foreign vessels operating in Lebanese waters to land and sell their cargo in Lebanese ports. This means fish caught from 'our waters' by foreign companies will compete with Lebanese fishermen's fish on their home turf, at lower prices due to industrial fishing efficiency, leading to price collapse and bankruptcy of local fishermen.

5.3 Food Security of Coastal Communities at Risk

Article 2 focuses on 'enhancing the aquaculture sector at the economic level' and encouraging investment. This discourse suggests a trend towards turning fish into a 'Cash Crop' for export to bring hard currency, instead of considering it a source of local food security. Amid the food crisis and rising meat prices, local fish (especially popular species) is a vital protein source. Directing investments towards export-oriented species or luxury hotels, and opening the sea to foreigners, threatens the food security of the poorest groups in Lebanon.

6. Chapter Five: Tax Justice and Social Protection – The Biggest Absentee

6.1 Article 105 Analysis: Unfair Fee Structure for the Poor

Article 105 sets detailed fees for fishing licenses. Although financial values might seem low due to inflation, the fee structure shows clear class bias:

• Small Fisherman: Fees are imposed meticulously on coastal fishing boats (less than 9 meters), where the fisherman pays a flat fee, an additional fee per meter of boat length, and a third fee for each 'type of fishing gear'. This accumulation burdens the 'Felouka' fisherman who may use several types of nets and hooks depending on the season.
• Major Companies: In contrast, paragraphs (3) and (6) leave determining fees for 'high seas fishing' and 'aquaculture licenses' to decrees issued later in agreement with the Minister of Finance. This 'legislative ambiguity' opens the door wide for lobbying groups and large companies to negotiate reduced fees or tax exemptions under the pretext of 'encouraging investment', while the small fisherman remains bound by rigid legal text.

6.2 Social Security Dilemma: Wasted Fishermen Rights between Texts and Reality

Perhaps the most notable absence in the draft law is 'social protection'. Fishermen's unions in Tyre, Sidon, and the North have long struggled to be included in the National Social Security Fund. Fishermen are exposed to high occupational risks (injuries, drowning, occupational diseases) and suffer from lack of income on stormy days or dead seasons. The new law imposes duties (licenses, fees, logs, equipment) and penalties, but offers no commitment from the state to provide health or social security in return. Article 16 obliges the fisherman to obtain a 'professional fisherman card', but does not link this card to any social benefits, turning it into a mere tool for collection and security control instead of professional protection.

With the approval of the new pension law in Lebanon (Law 319/2023), the new fishing law was supposed to clearly and bindingly link fishermen to this system, providing support mechanisms for paying contributions (via a special fund, for example), which the project completely overlooked.

6.3 Harsh Penalties (Chapter Ten): Criminalizing Poverty Instead of Addressing its Causes

Chapter Ten (Articles 109-125) includes a long list of penalties including imprisonment, heavy financial fines (reaching hundreds of millions of Liras), and equipment confiscation.

• Critique: In the absence of support programs to modernize equipment, punishing a fisherman using a 'narrow-mesh' net because he cannot afford a new legal one is 'criminalizing poverty'.
• Militarization of the Sector: Article 125 grants Ministry employees the right to request assistance from the Army and Security Forces. This text enshrines dealing with fishermen with a 'security' logic, reproducing daily tensions fishermen experience with security forces regarding exit and navigation permits, instead of adopting a developmental guidance approach.

7. Chapter Six: Environmental Sustainability – Between Slogans and Implementation

7.1 Banning Equipment Without Alternatives: Disguised Exclusion Policies

Articles (27-39) prohibit certain equipment (e.g., driftnets, small mesh nets). From a purely environmental perspective, this is necessary. However, socially, immediate application without subsidized alternatives means an economic death sentence for thousands. Limited initiatives exist, but remain temporary. The law should have mandated a 'Sustainable Fishing Transition Fund' to finance equipment replacement for artisanal fishers, ensuring environmental sustainability isn't at the cost of starving fishermen.

7.2 Marine Pollution and Coastal Privatization: Absent Responsibility

While stricter on fishermen, the law overlooks major causes of fish stock depletion:

• Pollution: Untreated sewage and industrial waste destroy marine habitats. Article 76 bans dumping, but penalties on factories/municipalities aren't applied as strictly as on individuals.
• Coastal Destruction: Land reclamation and random resort construction destroyed breeding grounds. The law insufficiently links fishery protection with stopping maritime property encroachments, focusing only on fishing activity, ignoring 'no fish without a healthy environment'.

7.3 Co-management: The Missing Principle in Decision Making

Article 4 restricts fishery management planning to the Minister/Directorate. This centralism excludes stakeholders (fishermen). Global experience proves 'Co-management', involving fishermen in law-making, is the only way to ensure voluntary compliance. Lack of legal text establishing Local Councils with union/coop reps makes the law top-down and detached from reality.

8. Conclusion and Strategic Recommendations

The draft law on aquatic fishing and aquaculture in its current form represents an incomplete, and in some aspects dangerous, step. It is a law designed with a traditional 'modernization' mindset that sees technology and large capitalist investment as the path to salvation, ignoring the social and rights-based dimension of the artisanal fishing sector. It threatens to transform the Lebanese sea from a 'commons' that nourishes society, into a 'private resource' invested by companies, while transforming fishermen from 'masters of the craft' into 'marginalized' or day laborers.

To repair this structural defect, and to ensure that the law is fair, sustainable, and compatible with international human rights standards, we propose the detailed amendments in the table below.